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When protests began in Kyiv in November 2013, no one could have predicted 
that they would ultimately result in the collapse of the Yanukovych government, 
the Russian annexation of Crimea, and a war in eastern Ukraine that would 
claim thousands of lives. Yet the crisis in Ukraine is not merely the product 
of a perfect storm of contingent events; it has deep historical roots in that 
nation’s crucial but ambivalent relationship with Russia. Ukraine played a 
central role in the consolidation of the tsarist empire, the invention of Russian 
nationalism, and the creation of the Soviet regime. It has also generated bold 
liberationist schemes that have shaken the very foundations of Russian/Soviet 
hegemony. Over the centuries, numerous parties have endeavored to simplify 
this complex history of intimacy and antipathy—to align Ukraine with a single 
ethno-religious group, ideological tradition, or cultural idea. Each of these 
efforts, however, has only generated new conflict and violence. The 2013–14 
crisis in Ukraine—the most recent iteration of this cycle of simplification and 
brutalization—provides a tragic reminder of the suffering that this pattern 
produces as well as the difficulty of escaping from it.
The Ukrainian lands played a crucial role in the definition of the Russian 
imperial project. In the mid-17th century, the Zaporizhian Cossacks wrested 
control of contemporary east-central Ukraine from the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth and established a polity of their own, the Hetmanate, under 
the protection of the Muscovite tsar. Claiming to defend ancient Rus´ customs 
that supposedly had been defiled by the region’s non-Orthodox populations, 
the Cossacks transformed a contested border zone into the spiritual center 
of Orthodox civilization, creating the Russian Empire’s densest network of 
Orthodox churches, seminaries, and printing presses. The cultural capital of the 
Hetmanate and the key role that it played in defending the Orthodox Church 
on its vulnerable western frontier offered its native sons the opportunity to 
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propagate the Cossacks’ unique cultural concerns and historical memory across 
the empire. Russia’s tsars relied on Ukrainian clerics to run the church and 
on Kyiv monks to write the first history of the East Slavs; it was a Hetmanate 
native, Feofan Prokopovych, who defined the mission of the autocracy under 
Peter the Great.1 
In spite of its contributions to the institutions and the ideology that 
undergirded the autocracy, the Hetmanate generated a potent critique of 
the tsarist system’s centralizing ambitions. Insistent that the Hetmanate’s 
long-standing traditions of martial democracy and decentralization reflected 
“authentic” Slavic values that dated back to Rus´, members of the Cossack elite 
denounced the autocracy as a German innovation. Pointing to the key role 
that they had played in advancing Orthodox interests on a sensitive frontier, 
they insisted that they were equals of the Russian tsars—not merely the “slaves” 
of the autocrat. The imperial state responded to these challenges with further 
infringements on Cossack rights, and eventually abolished the Hetmanate 
altogether. Yet the Cossack dream of freedom survived; well into the 19th 
century, the descendants of Cossack generals continued to nourish the culture 
and memory of their ancestors.2 
In the 19th century—by which time the Russian Empire had marched 
west to claim almost all of contemporary Ukraine, with the exception of the 
Austrian province of Galicia—the Ukrainian lands became the empire’s major 
center of Russian nationalist agitation. Although the rise of Russian nationalism 
was aided by the “Russification” efforts promoted by the imperial state, local 
actors generated much of the ideological content of the movement. Building on 
the early modern discourse that portrayed Ukraine as the center of Orthodox 
civilization, local clerics and intellectuals now insisted that their native land 
was the cradle of an Orthodox, East Slavic nation that had originated in Rus´. 
The Russian national idea that emerged from 19th-century Ukraine, however, 
proved unstable. In the 1870s, Kyiv’s Russian nationalist lobby began to splinter; 
one-time participants in the effort to define an East Slavic nation ultimately 
developed an alternative national project that claimed Rus´, the Cossacks, and 
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in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 161–298; 
Barbara Skinner, The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in 
18th-Century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
2009), 88–111.
 2 Zenon E. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the 
Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Serhii Plokhy, 
The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
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local folk culture as expressions of a separate Ukrainian nation. Meanwhile, the 
Poles and Jews who resided in the Ukrainian lands—whom Russian nationalists 
considered unwelcome interlopers at best and enemies of the Rus´ people at 
worst—organized nationalist movements of their own.3
 The rival nationalist groups that struggled for control of the Ukrainian 
lands in the last decades of the tsarist regime had common origins in a multi-
ethnic borderland culture and even borrowed tactics and rhetoric from one 
another.4 Yet each constructed monolithic historical narratives that treated 
well-bounded, self-evident, and primordial nations as the protagonists of 
history, thereby obscuring the interconnections betweem national movements. 
Ukraine’s Russian nationalists denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation 
and denounced its champions as servants of Polish and Jewish interests. 
Ukrainian nationalists highlighted their native land’s suffering under imperial 
rule without acknowledging the contributions that it had made to the tsarist 
system (or that they had made to Russian nationalist ideology before they 
had embraced the Ukrainian project). Nationalist thought soon transcended 
narrow circles of intellectuals, transforming everyday life and social practice. 
Many nationalists presented antipathy as a civic virtue, placing new strains on 
communities that had long relied on interethnic accommodation for survival.5
In the 20th century—the age of ideology—Ukraine played a central role 
in the creation of the Soviet system. Many of the avant-garde artists (Mikhail 
Bulgakov, Isaak Babel, Vasilii Kandinskii, and Kazimir Malevich) and 
Bolshevik activists (Lev Trotskii, Anatolii Lunacharskii, Grigorii Zinov´ev, and 
Mykola Skrypnyk) who envisioned a new society emerging on the ruins of 
the old empire boasted Ukrainian roots.6 By the 1920s, Ukraine had become 
the testing ground for the “affirmative action” campaign that aspired to uplift 
and acculturate the Soviet Union’s non-Russian nationalities and to reverse the 
damaging effects of imperialism and Russian chauvinism.7 
 3 Faith Hillis, Children of Rus´: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 21–113. See also A. I. Miller, “Ukrainskii vopros” v 
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Nationsbildung 1860–1920 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005); and Andreas Kappeler, Russland 
und die Ukraine: Verflochtene Biographien und Geschichten (Vienna: Böhlau, 2012).
 4 Serhii Bilen´kyi, Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian 
Political Imaginations (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
 5 Hillis, Children of Rus´, 117–80.
 6 Liliana Riga, The Bolsheviks and the Russian Empire (New York: Cambridge University 
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But the Ukrainian lands were also a major center of resistance to Soviet 
rule. Peasant communities resisted the breakneck collectivization instituted in 
the 1930s—an impulse driven at times by ideological opposition to Bolshevik 
rule and at others by local communities’ efforts to preserve their traditions. 
Convinced that nationalist saboteurs were to blame for slow progress in 
Ukraine, Stalin unleashed a manmade famine and a national terror that killed 
millions. The violence that unfolded in Soviet Ukraine provoked an extreme 
backlash in Galicia, which Poland claimed after World War I. Intellectuals 
there formulated a potent challenge to the Soviet system—an integral 
nationalist movement that regarded Poles, Jews, and Bolsheviks as enemies 
of the Ukrainian people. By the 1930s, the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists (OUN), which propagated this ideology, was staging regular 
attacks on its adversaries—and even on Ukrainian activists who rejected its 
radical views.8
Although it was Stalin and Hitler who brought World War II to Ukraine, 
the devastating conflict there could also be described as a civil war pitting 
local residents intent on preserving the Soviet empire against those who 
wished to destroy it. Loyal Soviet citizens hailed the war as an opportunity 
to eliminate fascism once and for all and to “reunite” Soviet Ukrainians with 
their Galician brothers; Soviet Ukraine provided much of the manpower and 
matériel that sustained Stalin’s war effort. But Ukraine also became a leading 
center of anti-Soviet activity. The followers of Stepan Bandera, the wartime 
leader of the OUN’s most militant branch, launched a national revolution 
amid the chaos of the war. Defining national liberation as the creation of a 
“Ukraine for Ukrainians,” Bandera’s men participated in the ethnic cleansing 
of local Jews and Poles and conducted a partisan war against the Red Army 
that lasted until the 1950s.9 
In the war’s aftermath, the deep contradictions in Ukraine’s war experience 
gave rise to conflicting monolithic narratives. Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid 
Brezhnev—both of whom had served as war commissars and party bosses in 
of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 18–47.
 8 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 
2010), 21–58, 89–118; Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, 
Belarus, 1569–1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 142–53.
 9 Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik 
Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin’s 
Empire of Memory: Russian–Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2004), 24–52; Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “The Ukrainian 
‘National Revolution’ of 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement,” Kritika 12, 1 
(2011): 83–114. 
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eastern Ukraine—created a cult of the war, which recognized and celebrated 
the sacrifices that Soviet citizens had made to defeat Hitler. (The official 
Soviet narrative of the war was, however, replete with silences, as it refused to 
acknowledge the atrocities committed by Soviet forces, the special suffering 
that Ukrainian Jews endured, and the complicity of Soviet citizens in ethnic 
cleansing).10 Galicia, which came under Soviet rule only with Stalin’s invasion 
of Poland in 1939, nourished a separate memory of the war, which celebrated 
Bandera and the OUN as freedom fighters. Galicians’ devotion to this 
alternative narrative sustained an active national resistance movement in the 
region throughout the late Soviet years.11 
The first 15 years of Ukrainian independence offered a temporary respite 
from repeated attempts to transform a complicated history of intimacy and 
antipathy into a monolithic narrative. Although Ukraine’s proper relationship 
with Russia remained a controversial topic, the founders of the new state 
endeavored to build a civic nation that affirmed ethnic, linguistic, and ideological 
diversity.12 Trends in Ukrainian historiography reflected the pluralistic turn in 
society at large. A new generation of historians, bolstered by institutions such 
as the L´viv-based Center for the Urban History of East Central Europe and 
the journal Ukraina moderna, created a post-Soviet history for Ukraine that 
highlighted its heterogeneity and complexity.
Two trends of the 2000s imperiled these promising developments. The first 
was the rise of Vladimir Putin, who resurrected old legacies of authoritarianism, 
imperialism, and nationalism, treating Ukraine as a vassal state rather than a 
sovereign nation. The second development that undermined Ukraine’s pluralistic 
politics was the 2004 Orange Revolution. In attempting to cleanse Ukraine of 
the harmful remnants of the Soviet past and to protect it from renewed threats 
of Russian domination, its leaders initiated their own campaign to simplify 
and purify the nation’s history. The government of Viktor Yushchenko strongly 
aligned itself with Galician memory politics, declaring Bandera a national hero, 
offering pensions to veterans of the OUN’s paramilitary units, and presenting 
10 Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in 
Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 106–57; David Marples, Heroes and Villains: Creating 
National History in Contemporary Ukraine (New York: Central European University Press, 
2007), 125–202.
11 William Jay Risch, The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 53–81, 119–219. 
12 Serhii Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union (New York: Basic Books, 
2014), 277–94; Andrei Portnov, “Istorii dlia domashnego upotrebleniia,” Ab Imperio, no. 3 
(2012): 309–24.
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the 1932–33 famine as a genocide directed against the Ukrainian nation.13 In 
addition to replicating the totalizing worldview that many Ukrainian patriots 
despised in Russian imperial and Soviet politics, this new historical orthodoxy 
alienated the sizable segment of Ukrainians who identified with Soviet culture 
and viewed Bandera as a villain.14 The actions of the “Orange” politicians also 
radicalized Putin, whose efforts to keep Ukraine in Russia’s imperial orbit now 
seemed to be jeopardized.15 
Over the past year, Ukrainian society has again revealed its ability to 
imagine alternatives to Russian hegemony but has also produced dangerous 
new totalizing discourses. The Euromaidan movement testified to the civic 
maturity of the Ukrainian nation, uniting protesters from all walks of life. Yet 
in their fervent attempts to create a more democratic and less corrupt Ukraine, 
the protestors engaged in rhetoric and actions that undermined their stated 
commitment to pluralism. Images and slogans of Bandera figured prominently 
in the demonstrations; extreme right-wing groups resorted to violence, which 
they presented as redemptory.16 When confronted by opponents of the 
Euromaidan—who constituted around 40 percent of the Ukrainian population 
and much more in the East and South—supporters of the revolution dismissed 
their critics as “dregs” (sovki ) of Ukrainian society unsuited for membership in 
the nation.17 Rather than initiating a dialogue with the revolution’s critics, the 
governments created after the collapse of the Yanukovych regime endeavored 
to marginalize them. Recent legislation will effectively destroy the two most 
popular political parties in eastern and southern Ukraine.18 President Petro 
13 The Ukrainian Institute for National Memory, established by Yushchenko in 2006, played 
an important role in these efforts. See, for example, Volodymyr Viatrovych et al., Ukrains´ka 
povstans´ka armiia: Istoriia neskorenykh (Kyiv: Ukrains´kyi instytut natsional´noi pam´iati, 
2008).
14 John-Paul Himka, “The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine,” in 
Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe, ed. 
Himka and Joanna Beata Michlic (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 626–61.
15 Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 
179–80.
16 For prescient warnings about these dangers, see David Marples, “Ukraine: The View from 
the West,” 20 February 2014 (www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/david-marples/ukraine-
view-from-west, all websites accessed 14 December 2014); and Tarik Cyril Amar, Omer 
Bartov, and Per Rudling, “Supporting Ukraine Means Opposing Anti-Semitic Nationalism 
Now, Not Later,” 24 March 2014 (http://tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/166945/
no-time-to-waste-in-ukraine). 
17 Andriy Portnov, “Ukraina ta ii ‘dalekyi skhid’: Pro halyts´kyi reduktsionizm ta ioho 
henealohiiu,” 1 August 2014 (www.historians.in.ua/index.php/avtorska-kolonka/1231-andrii-
portnov-ukraina-ta-ii-dalekyi-skhid-pro-halytskyi-reduktsionizm-ta-ioho-henealohiiu).
18 The Communist Party, which won 13 percent of the national popular vote in 2012, has 
been banned outright, and “lustration” legislation will destroy the infrastructure of the Party 
of Regions. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFERL), “Ukraine’s Lustration Process 
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Poroshenko has signaled that he will resume Yushchenko’s efforts to rehabilitate 
the OUN and its paramilitary units.19 Volodymyr Viatrovych, the controversial 
historian who now heads the Institute for National Memory, has opened an 
“historical front” that aspires to use Ukrainian history as a weapon in the 
ongoing “information war” against Russia.20
The postrevolutionary governments’ disregard for their critics led to protests 
and violent clashes across Ukraine’s East and South in the winter and spring of 
2014.21 It also emboldened Russia’s most extreme imperialist and nationalist 
voices, providing imagery and sound bites for an elaborate propaganda campaign 
claiming that a “fascist junta” had seized control of Ukraine.22 Putin invoked 
this fantasy to justify his annexation of Crimea as well as his repeated incursions 
into the Donbas in support of the separatist insurgency that coalesced there in 
April. Meanwhile, the separatists and Russian nationalists active in the Donbas 
embarked on their own attempts to simplify and purify Ukraine’s complex 
history. Denying Ukraine’s very existence, they imagine the nation’s eastern and 
southern periphery as “New Russia,” and they rely on terror and repression to 
silence those who challenge their political agenda and historical memory.23 
The war in the Donbas further radicalized Ukraine’s government and civil 
society. Kyiv relied on right-wing militias—some of which adhere to neo-Nazi 
ideology—to combat the insurgency and offered nationalist vigilantes a carte 
Unlikely to Be Smooth Sailing,” 12 April 2014 (www.rferl.org/content/ukraines-lustration-
process-unlikely-to-be-smooth-sailing/25330579.html). 
19 Mat Babiak, “Poroshenko: ‘UPA Are Heroes,’ Will Consider Giving Veterans Legal Status,” 
26 September 2014 (http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/09/26/poroshenko-to-consider-
giving-upa-veterans-legal-status). In October 2014, Poroshenko announced that he will change 
the “Day of the Defender of the Fatherland” to 14 October, a day traditionally commemorated 
as the anniversary of the creation of the OUN’s paramilitary army.
20 Viatrovych’s martial tropes and his very terminology for this effort—which he describes as 
a “likbez” operation to eliminate “historical illiteracy”—are indebted to Bolshevik rhetoric. 
(http://likbez.org.ua/uk) Several scholars have charged that Viatrovych’s memory politics 
whitewash the wartime atrocities of the OUN and nationalist paramilitary units (Portnov, 
“Istorii dlia domashnego upotrebleniia,” 324–38). 
21 For a detailed study of regional attitudes, see “Stavlennia do situatsii na Skhodi,” 22 July 
2014 (www.ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/data/entry/14098). Vice News provided 
remarkable reporting on events in eastern and southern Ukraine as they unfolded (https://
news.vice.com/show/russian-roulette).
22 The “biker show” staged during Putin’s visit to Sevastopol´ in August 2014 offers a glimpse 
into the violent Ukrainian fantasies of Russian nationalists. It portrayed the Ukrainian 
revolution not only as a Nazi coup but also as an international conspiracy directed by satanic 
forces (www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPnb97ybtiU).
23 In September 2014, for example, separatists seized control of the History Department at 
Donetsk National University and demanded that all employees swear loyalty oaths (“Boiovyky 
rozihnaly kafedry istorii Ukrainy v DonNU,” Ukrains´ka pravda, 19 September 2014 [www.
pravda.com.ua/news/2014/09/19/7038338]).
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blanche in eastern Ukraine.24 It endorsed sweeping laws on censorship and 
arbitrary detention aimed at silencing Ukraine’s internal “enemies.”25 Some 
Ukrainian patriots have even presented mass murder as a legitimate solution 
to the nation’s “eastern” problem.26 Society at war produced violent and 
authoritarian impulses that further complicated Ukraine’s evolution into the 
functional and democratic state of which the Euromaidan protesters dreamed.27
Efforts to create monolithic historical narratives, to develop anti-Soviet 
cults of personality, and to silence dissenting voices will not alleviate the 
threats that a bellicose Russia poses to Ukrainian sovereignty; on the contrary, 
attempts to simplify and purify a complex space will only entrap Ukraine in 
continuing cycles of violence. Ukraine’s best defense against aggressors who 
deny its very existence is to develop a capacious understanding of its past that 
acknowledges the suffering that its population endured under imperialism, 
national chauvinism, and communism, as well as the role that its inhabitants 
played in creating these systems in the first place. Its best response to threats 
to its territorial integrity is a rigorous political pluralism that celebrates the 
diversity of its residents, past and present. 
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